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1 Introduction
For markets and competition to work, well-informed consumers are essen-
tial.1 The degree of information and transparency in a market and, hence,
the environment under which consumers make their purchase decisions
can be heavily influenced by firm strategy. For instance, by deliberately in-
creasing the complexity of price structure or price presentation, firms may
make consumers’ decision processes harder. Such strategies by firms with
the intent of confusing consumers have commonly been termed obfuscation
(Ellison and Ellison, 2009).
The aim of this paper is to understand firms’ incentives to obfuscate in a
setting where firms differ in their (marginal) costs of production and the
effects of price regulation. The question is whether low efficiency firms can
use obfuscation tactics to hide their high costs. To this end, we develop a
duopoly model where two heterogeneous firms compete to supply a ho-
mogeneous product. There are two types of consumers: sophisticated and
naive consumers. Sophisticated consumers can perfectly evaluate the firms’
offers and pick the better one. Naive consumers are not able to compare the
two offers, and thus randomly choose one of the two offers.
By obfuscation firms can increase the number of naive consumers in the
market. In practice, this could be the use of different price formats or terms
and language which makes it harder for some consumers to fully under-
stand pricing and, hence, impedes comparisons between different offers.
For example, although in many countries supermarkets are required to dis-
play unit prices for groceries, in reality “[unit prices] were often not be-
ing displayed on multi-buys or promotions, and different units were used
for varieties of the same product, making them extremely difficult to com-
pare”.2 The retail financial industry is also known for using obfuscation
tactics to disorient consumers.3 Alternatively, an increase in obfuscation
1Imperfect consumer decision making has been documented in many markets, such as
retail financial markets (Campbell, 2006), telecommunication markets (Miravete, 2013) and
electricity markets (Wilson and Waddams, 2010), among others.
2See the Guardian report by Smithers (2011) who cites the research done by the consumer
campaigning charity Which?. Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)
provide theoretical treatments of this approach.
3See, e.g., Carlin and Manso (2011) who study the interaction between obfuscation and
investor sophistication in mutual fund markets.
2
might also correspond to the number of price elements (as in mobile phone
contracts) which may also make it harder for consumers to evaluate differ-
ent offers and pick the best deal.4
We show that the high-cost firm always benefits from more naive consumers.
Hence, this firm chooses to obfuscate as much as possible. In contrast, the
low-cost firm has ambiguous preferences towards the share of naive con-
sumers. On the one hand, more transparency hurts the firms as pricing
becomes more competitive. On the other hand, due to its lower production
costs, this firm has an advantage in competing for sophisticated consumers.
This second effect is stronger the larger the cost advantage is. As a result,
the more efficient firm chooses to obfuscate as much as possible if the cost
advantage is small, but chooses not to obfuscate at all if its cost advantage
is sufficiently large.
On the policy front, this paper argues that imposing a price cap can be an
effective measure of consumer protection in this context. We show that in-
troducing a price cap is beneficial for consumers for two reasons. First, there
is an immediate positive impact as pricing by firms becomes more compet-
itive. However, there is a second and more important positive effect which
works via the obfuscation decisions. Due to the introduction of the price cap
the low-cost firm may choose not to obfuscate anymore. The reason is that
serving the naive consumers has become a less attractive option and com-
peting for the sophisticated consumers a relatively more attractive option.
As a consequence, the low-cost firm which has an advantage in attracting
sophisticated consumers may prefer to stop obfuscating. Thus in the current
setup, a price cap has the new role of leading to more transparent pricing.
Importantly, beneficial effects of price regulation also extend to social wel-
fare. We show that with more competitive pricing from both firms, the
probability that the high-cost firm’s price is lower decreases. This shifts
the demand of sophisticated consumers from the high-cost firm to the low-
cost firm and hence, improves social welfare. Moreover, when a price cap
reduces obfuscation, more consumers become sophisticated and are able
to buy from the lower priced firm. This further increases social welfare be-
4Spiegler (2006) considers a setup where consumers are confused by a multitude of price
dimensions. In addition, firms may also shroud certain price elements. See, e.g., Gabaix
and Laibson (2006).
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cause overall it is the low-cost firm that is more likely to have the lower price
in equilibrium. This discussion of production efficiency in the presence of
strategic obfuscation is a novel part of the current paper.
When policies that directly combat obfuscation are difficult to implement
or easy to be circumvented, a price cap might be a feasible alternative. In-
deed, the introduction of price caps in markets with incomplete consumer
understanding, such as banking or telecommunications markets, has been
discussed extensively among policy makers. For instance, in retail financial
markets, caps on credit card interest rates, unauthorised overdraft interest
rates or on surcharges charged for foreign ATM withdrawals are heavily
discussed. With the purpose of helping inattentive consumers, in telecom-
munications markets, the EU has introduced caps on mobile data roaming
charges and SMS services. This paper suggests that such policies might
have been effective to help consumers make better decisions.
We point out that the effectiveness of a price cap in the current setup is
in contrast to that of a model with rational and strategic consumers only
and relies on the presence of behavioural consumers. For instance, based
on Burdett and Judd’s (1983) search model, Fershtman and Fishman (1994)
and Armstrong et al. (2009) point out that under a price cap prices will
likely be less dispersed and hence fewer consumers will make the effort
to become better informed. Consequently, firms will face less competition
and will raise their average prices. Therefore, in such models a price cap
may backfire and hurt consumers. We also note that, in standard models
without obfuscation, price cap regulation is neither universally optimal, es-
pecially when demand is uncertain. See, for example, Dobbs (2004) and
Earle et al. (2007). Discouraged market entry and asymmetric information
between regulated firms and the regulator can also be additional sources of
inefficiency.
Besides price regulation, we discuss two alternative policy measures in the
current setting. One consumer protection policy could simply be limiting
the scope of obfuscation. While such policies are effective in reducing firm
obfuscation and increase the share of sophisticated consumers, in practice
they often can easily be circumvented. The other policy measure we discuss
is taxation in the form of an excise. Although such a policy generally raises
the price consumers pay, it can be effective in reducing the more efficient
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firm’s incentive to obfuscate and even in improving production efficiency.
When regulators are willing to trade consumer surplus for efficiency, taxa-
tion can be a useful tool in combating obfuscation. In light of this analysis,
the Air Passenger Duty might have inadvertently reduced more efficient air-
lines’ and/or travel agencies’ incentives to present air travel prices in more
complicated ways.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first briefly discuss the
related literature in Section 2. We then introduce our model in Section 3.
After the equilibrium analysis in Section 4, Section 5 studies the effect of a
price cap on pricing and on consumer welfare. An analysis of social welfare
is presented in Section 6. In Section 7 we discuss the two extensions. Section
8 concludes.
2 Related literature
Recently, a new stream of literature has emerged that studies competition
in the presence of behaviourally biased consumers.5 In this context, an im-
portant question is whether and how firms might decide to confuse con-
sumers (obfuscation) in order to increase market power. For instance, and
closely related to the present paper, Carlin (2009) studies the incentives to
obfuscate in an oligopoly withn symmetric firms. He shows that more com-
petition in the form of a larger number of firms increases the incentives to
obfuscate. Piccione and Spiegler (2009) and Gu and Wenzel (2014) study an
asymmetric setup where firms differ in the ability to attract naive consumers
(prominence). Gu and Wenzel (2014) also show that more prominent firms
may have more incentives to obfuscate and policies that regulate obfusca-
tion may not be effective due to the reaction from less prominent firms. The
novelty of the present paper is to understand firm’s obfuscation incentives
in an asymmetric duopoly where firms differ in their productivity levels.
We argue that price regulation is a sensible consumer protection policy. In
particular, it reduces firms’ incentives to obfuscate and thus helps to pro-
mote market sophistication and production efficiency.
5See Spiegler (2011) for a textbook treatment and Huck and Zhou (2011) for an overview
on this literature.
5
Focusing on how firms may obfuscate the market, Piccione and Spiegler
(2012) provide a duopoly framework in which firms independently choose
from a set of available price frames with different combinations resulting in
different levels of comparability for consumers. The authors show that reg-
ulatory interventions that aim to facilitate comparisons may lead to a less
competitive market outcome. Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) provide a frame-
work in which firms independently choose from two possible price frames
but this simpler construction can accommodate more than two firms and al-
lows for the distinction of frame complexity and frame differentiation. They
show that an increase in the number of competitors may result in higher
industry profits and lower consumer surplus. In contrast, modelling of ob-
fuscation in our paper follows Carlin (2009) and we introduce asymmetric
competitors in terms of their production costs. We show that regulatory in-
terventions in the form of a price cap can be effective not only in protecting
consumers but also in improving efficiency in production allocation.
Obfuscation also becomes relevant when consumers are unable to evalu-
ate all characteristics or price elements of a product. Assuming a random
sampling procedure by consumers, Spiegler (2006) shows that firms adopt
a random pricing strategy with high prices in some dimensions and low
prices along other dimensions. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) develop a model
where consumers observe one price component (price of the base good), but
are not aware of another component (the add-on). This leads to an equilib-
rium with low base-good and high add-on prices. Dahremoeller (2013) and
Wenzel (2015) study shrouding incentives in asymmetric markets where
firms differ in cost, but do not consider policy interventions. Spiegler (2014)
provides a general duopoly framework that captures a variety of obfusca-
tion strategies (shrouding product attributes, multi-dimensional pricing or
framing in order to reduce product comparability).
In a framework with rational consumers only, an alternative description
of obfuscation may also arise by firms manipulating search costs. Wilson
(2010) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) analyse search models where firms
can obfuscate by increasing consumers’ search costs. Petrikaite (2015) offers
a framework where a multiproduct monopolist uses search costs to screen
consumers.
Although most of the contributions so far are theoretical, there have also
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been a few experimental studies. Kalayci and Potters (2011) examine whether
buyer confusion increases market prices and find results that support the ef-
fectiveness of buyer confusion. In particular, they find that firms offering
high-quality are are less likely to employ obfuscation strategies than firms
offering a low quality. Kalayci (2015) presents experimental evidence that
a seller’s complexity and price choices are positively correlated. This is in
contrast to the findings in Sitzia and Zizzo (2011) where the authors are un-
able to detect a significant effect of product complexity on prices.6 Gu and
Wenzel (2015) study the effects of different policies (a consumer protection
policy and policies that level the playing field among firms) on firms’ incen-
tives to strategically obfuscate the market.
3 The model
We consider a market where two firms compete to supply a homogeneous
product. The two firms differ in their (constant) marginal costs of producing
this product. Firm 1 has a marginal cost of c1 and Firm 2 has a cost of c2. We
assume that 0 < c1 < c2 so that Firm 1 is designated to be the low-cost firm.7
A mass one of consumers wishes to buy at most one unit of the product if
the price does not exceed the reservation value of r. This reservation value
is larger than the production costs of both firms so that, in equilibrium, both
firms are active (r > c2).
As in Varian (1980), there are two types of consumers: sophisticated and
naive consumers. The share of naive consumers is denoted by µ whereas
the share of sophisticated consumers is (1 − µ). Sophisticated consumers
understand true offering prices and buy from the firm that offers the lower
price. A tie is broken with an equal probability. Naive consumers are unable
to compare prices and buy at random. Naive consumers choose either of the
two firms equally likely.8
6While these studies conduct experiments in a laboratory setting, related questions have
also been studied using field experiments. See, e.g., Hossain and Morgan (2006), Chetty
et al. (2009), and Brown et al. (2010).
7The model can be extended to oligopoly with more than two firms. However, as this
does not the main qualitative results of the paper, we focus here on the duopoly case.
8This assumption of random shopping of confused consumers is also employed in related
papers, for instance, in Carlin (2009) or in the price-frame-competition models by Piccione
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As in Carlin (2009) the share of naive consumers can be influenced by firms’
obfuscation strategies. Let ki ∈ [k, k], i = 1, 2, be Firm i’s obfuscation choice
where a higher level of ki is interpreted as a higher level of obfuscation. The
share of naive consumers is then given by µ(k1, k2) where ∂µ(k1,k2)∂ki > 0. The
share of sophisticated consumers is correspondingly reduced if firms chose
to obfuscate more. To focus on strategic effects among firms, the obfuscation
choice is costless.9
We consider the following game. In the first stage, the two firms simulta-
neously and independently decide on its own obfuscation level ki. After
knowing each other’s obfuscation level and hence, the share of naive con-
sumers, they compete in prices in the second stage.
We note that in our model obfuscation and pricing decisions are sequential.
With sequential decisions, we assume pricing is more flexible while obfus-
cation tends to be more persistent. For example, in retail financial markets,
pricing is much more flexible than obfuscation strategies such as inventing
new terminologies. With simultaneous decisions, on the other hand, one
would assume that price and obfuscation are joint decisions.10
and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). Note that we assume that naive con-
sumers do not understand that, as it will later turn out, in equilibrium Firm 1 will charge a
lower price than Firm 2 on average. This seems to be consistent with our notion of naiveness.
Consumers who fail to recognize the best offer are also unlikely to consider that one firm
might have a larger incentives for higher prices than another firm due to cost differences.
9Note that instead of interpreting k as no obfuscation it could also be interpreted as
counter obfuscation or advertising, strictly increasing the number of sophisticated con-
sumers. This alternative interpretation, however, has no qualitative effects on our main
results.
10The approach with simultaneous decisions is followed, for instance, in Carlin (2009),
Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013). Which approach is more suit-
able depends largely on context where with sequential decisions one would assume pricing
is more flexible and obfuscation decisions more persistent. Assuming a simultaneous move
game would, however, lead to a qualitatively similar structure of equilibrium obfuscation
as under sequential moves. The high-cost firm has larger incentives to obfuscate and would
choose to obfuscate more often than the low-cost firm because it clearly benefits to a larger
degree from the presence of myopic consumers. This is because the high-cost firm charges
on average higher prices than the low-cost firm and only naive consumer would buy at such
higher prices.
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4 Analysis
4.1 Pricing stage
We start by analysing the second stage of the game. At this stage, with a
given share of naive consumers and a given pair of prices, the firms’ profits
are as follows. For i = 1, 2 and j 6= i,
Πi(µ, pi, pj) =

(pi − ci)
[µ
2 + (1− µ)
]
if pi < pj
(pi − ci)
[
µ
2 +
1−µ
2
]
if pi = pj
(pi − ci)µ2 if pi > pj
. (1)
The following proposition details the price equilibrium in mixed strategies:
Proposition 1. For any given share of naive consumers, µ ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the pricing stage, in which Firm 1 prices
according to the cumulative distribution function
F1(p) =

0 if p < p0
1− µ(r−p)2(1−µ)(p−c2) if p0 ≤ p < r
1 if p ≥ r
, (2)
and Firm 2 prices according to the cumulative distribution function
F2(p) =

0 if p < p0
1− µ(r−p)2(1−µ)(p−c1) −
c2−c1
p−c1 if p0 ≤ p < r
1 if p ≥ r
, (3)
where p0 = µ(r−c2)2−µ + c2 is the lower bound of both firms’ prices.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
It is clear that there exists no pure strategy pricing equilibrium due to the
presence of sophisticated consumers. The price distributions in Proposition
1 are such that given the rival’s strategy a firm is indifferent regarding all
prices in its support. Note that the price distribution of Firm 2 has a mass
point at r. With a probability of c2−c1r−c1 this firm sets the price equal to the
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reservation price.
Let P1 and P2 denote the two firms’ equilibrium prices whose cumulative
distribution functions are (2) and (3), respectively. For convenience when
discussing stochastic dominance relations, we let all price distributions in
this paper have the same (extended) support of [c2, r]. We write X st Y
if random variable X first order stochastically dominates Y and X st Y if
X st Y but Y 6st X . Then, we have
Corollary 1. P2 st P1 with F2(p) < F1(p) for all p ∈ (p0, r).
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
By standard results in stochastic dominance,11 Corollary 1 implies that the
high-cost firm charges on average a higher price than the low-cost firm. This
confirms the intuition that more efficient firms compete more aggressively
in prices.
Ex ante expected profits of the two firms are
Π̂1 = (r − c1) µ
2
+ (c2 − c1) (1− µ) and (4)
Π̂2 = (r − c2) µ
2
. (5)
The less efficient Firm 2 makes expected profits equal to the amount from
selling only to its share of naive consumers at the reservation price, (r−c2)µ2 .
The more efficient Firm 1’s expected profits, however, also include a part
which is associated with the share of sophisticated consumers, (c2− c1)(1−
µ).12 Note that this is exactly the Bertrand profit the low-cost Firm can make
in a market with only a measure (1 − µ) of sophisticated consumers. This
part of profit is unique to asymmetric costs as the rent from sophisticated
consumers will be completely competed away if the firms had the same
costs. The composition of the firms’ profits has implications on their choices
of obfuscation which we now analyse.
11For instance, Lemma 4.1 in Wolfstetter (1999).
12We also note that, for any given share of naive consumers, the efficient Firm 1 earns
strictly higher profits than the less efficient Firm 2.
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4.2 Obfuscation choices
In the first stage, Firm 2’s profits are strictly increasing in the share of naive
consumers:
∂Π̂2
∂k2
=
r − c2
2
∂µ
∂k2
> 0. (6)
Hence, this firm chooses obfuscation as high as possible, that is, k∗2 = k. The
partial derivative of Firm 1’s profits with respect to the obfuscation choice
k1 is given by:
∂Π̂1
∂k1
=
r + c1 − 2c2
2
∂µ
∂k1
≷ 0. (7)
This partial derivative is negative if c1 < 2c2−r. In this case, Firm 1 benefits
from a more transparent market, i.e., fewer naive consumers, and hence
chooses its obfuscation to be as low as possible, that is, k∗1 = k. If, however,
c1 > 2c2− r, Firm 1 prefers the market to be as least transparent as possible
and, in consequence, raises its obfuscation to the maximum possible level,
k∗1 = k.
Define c˜1 := 2c2− r. The following Proposition states equilibrium obfusca-
tion.
Proposition 2.
i) The high-cost Firm 2 chooses k∗2 = k¯.
ii) The low-cost Firm 1 chooses k∗1 = k¯ if c1 > c˜1 and chooses k∗1 = k if c1 <
c˜1. If c˜1 = 2c2 − r, Firm 1 is indifferent about the level of obfuscation.
In equilibrium, the high-cost firm always chooses maximum obfuscation.
This firm’s profits are strictly increasing with the number of naive con-
sumers and so it has incentives to raise obfuscation as much as possible.
By contrast, Firm 1’s obfuscation strategy depends on its efficiency advan-
tage vis-a-vis Firm 2. If the efficiency advantage is large, Firm 1 benefits
from the presence of sophisticated consumers and chooses the lowest level
of obfuscation. The underlying reason is that this efficiency advantage pro-
vides Firm 1 with an advantage over Firm 2 in competing for sophisticated
consumers. Consequently, Firm 1 prefers to have as many sophisticated con-
sumers as possible. If, on the other side, the efficiency advantage is small
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and firms are rather symmetric, Firm 1 prefers the highest possible level of
obfuscation.
The following corollary summarises equilibrium obfuscation by providing
the equilibrium share of naive consumers:
Corollary 2. Define µ = µ(k, k) and µ = µ(k, k). The equilibrium share of
naive consumers is
µ∗ =

µ if c1 > c˜1
∈ (µ, µ) if c1 = c˜1
µ if c1 < c˜1
. (8)
At this point we would like to briefly comment on the case of identical costs,
which is covered by our analysis when c2 → c1. When c2 → c1, both pricing
distributions converge towards each other such that there is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies in the pricing stage (and there is no
mass point on r). Also, both firms’ profits converge towards limc2→c1 Π1 =
limc2→c1 Π2 = (r−c1)µ2 . In this equilibrium, profits are strictly increasing in
the number of naive consumers such that both firms would obfuscate at the
maximum level. In this sense, the outcome resembles the case where the
efficiency advantage is small, as covered in the previous results. We also
note that with identical costs, the results in the following sections coincide
with the case of low cost difference. The only difference arises that with
identical costs there are no social welfare effects for regulation.
4.3 Scope for obfuscation
From a public policy point of view, direct measures of consumer protection
against obfuscation can be envisaged. In this section we discuss whether
a regulation that limits the scope for obfuscation is effective or not in the
current setting. Such a policy intervention can be modelled as a cap on the
maximum level of obfuscation k.
Suppose that such a policy decreases the upper bound of obfuscation to a
level of k′ < k. Note that the conditions of whether a firm prefers more or
less naive consumers are independent of the scope for obfuscation (see (6)
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and (7)). Therefore, in the case where Firm 1 does not obfuscate the share
of naive consumers is reduced to µ′ where µ′ = µ(k, k′). In the case where
Firm 1 obfuscates the impact of the policy is even larger as the behaviour of
Firm 1 is also affected.
Due to the decrease in the share of naive consumers, both firms’ prices and
the first order statistic of them decrease in the usual stochastic order. It fol-
lows that consumer surplus will unambiguously increase. Moreover, since
t as defined in Lemma 1 increases in µ, following the proof of Lemma 2 in
Appendix A.5, it is easily verified that when the share of naive consumers
decreases, the probability of the inefficient Firm 2 having the lower price
decreases. Thus, in this setting with two firms that differ in their costs, lim-
iting the scope for obfuscation improves social welfare.
Policies that directly limit the scope for obfuscation, however, might not
be effective in practice as firms may find alternative ways to confuse con-
sumers. For example, although regulatory bodies can require airlines, ho-
tels and travel agencies to quote prices that include all necessary taxes, fees,
charges and surcharges, contingency charges and the prices of optional ser-
vices often surprise many consumers. Therefore, in the remainder of the pa-
per we focus on alternative policies and analyse whether they can be helpful
in combating obfuscation.
5 Introducing a price cap
Having analysed the base model, we now investigate whether introducing a
price cap is a useful policy for promoting market sophistication and raising
consumer and social welfare. We consider the case where the price cap, i.e.,
the maximum price that can be charged κ, is neither irrelevantly high nor
too strict to effectively shut down the less efficient firm: c2 < κ < r.
When a price cap κ ∈ (c2, r) is imposed, from the firms’ point of view, this is
strategically equivalent to a reduction in consumers’ reservation price from
r to κ. Therefore, all of our previous results can be readily applied for the
current purpose.
By replacing r by κ in (4) and (5), we have the expected profits of the two
firms. As in Proposition 2, the high-cost Firm 2 will still choose maximum
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obfuscation. The low-cost Firm 1, however, will now prefer maximum ob-
fuscation only when c1 > 2c2 − κ where 2c2 − κ > c˜1 as κ < r. If, however,
c˜1 < c1 < 2c2 − κ, Firm 1’s incentive to obfuscate is strictly reduced. In this
case, Firm 1 would have chosen maximum obfuscation without the price
cap but will now choose minimum obfuscation. If c1 < c˜1, then Firm 1 still
chooses minimum obfuscation. To summarise, if the cost difference is small
(c1 > c˜1) then a sufficiently strong price cap (κ < 2c2− c1) strictly decreases
firm obfuscation. Otherwise, firm obfuscation is unaffected. The following
Proposition gives the result in terms of market sophistication.
Corollary 3. Suppose a price cap κ ∈ (c2, r) is introduced.
• If κ < 2c2 − c1 < r, then the equilibrium share of naive consumers
decreases from µ to µ.
• If 2c2 − c1 < κ < r [κ < r < 2c2 − c1], then the equilibrium share of
naive consumers remains unchanged at µ [µ].
The intuition for Firm 1’s reduced incentive in obfuscation is the follow-
ing. After the price limit is introduced, the benefit from serving naive con-
sumers has been reduced (only a price of up to κ can be charged) and, hence,
competing for sophisticated consumer has become a more attractive option.
This effect benefits Firm 1 as its lower cost enables this firm to compete more
successfully for sophisticated, price sensitive consumers. If this effect is suf-
ficiently strong, i.e., the price cap sufficiently low, Firm 1 may choose not to
obfuscate as to increase the share of sophisticated consumers.
5.1 Consumer welfare
Since all consumers buy one unit of product, consumer surplus is inversely
related to the price they pay. The effects of a price cap on consumer welfare
can hence be studied by ordering price distributions. As the equilibrium
share of naive consumers can change after the price limit, we make the de-
pendence of price distributions on µ explicit. Following (2) and (3), the cu-
mulative distribution functions of Firm i’s equilibrium price P κ,µi , i = 1, 2,
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under the price cap κ and the share of naive consumers µ are respectively,
F κ,µ1 (p) =

0 if p < pκ,µ0
1− µ(κ−p)2(1−µ)(p−c2) if p
κ,µ
0 ≤ p < κ
1 if p ≥ κ
(9)
and F κ,µ2 (p) =

0 if p < pκ,µ0
1− µ(κ−p)2(1−µ)(p−c1) −
c2−c1
p−c1 if p
κ,µ
0 ≤ p < κ
1 if p ≥ κ
, (10)
where pκ,µ0 =
µ(κ−c2)
2−µ + c2 is the lower bound of both firms’ prices.
After imposing a price cap, the upper bound of the prices naturally de-
creases. Because pκ,µ0 increases in κ and µ, irrespective whether or not firm
obfuscation is affected, the lower bound of the prices also decreases. Indeed,
we show that both firms’ equilibrium prices decrease in terms of the usual
stochastic order. Moreover, the price that sophisticated consumers pay —
the first order statistic of the two firms’ prices — also decreases in the usual
stochastic order. Let P κ,µ(1) denote the first order statistic of P
κ,µ
1 and P
κ,µ
2 .
For clarity, we write P r,µi and P
r,µ
(1) when no price cap is imposed. The next
Proposition formalises the above result.
Proposition 3. Suppose a price cap κ ∈ (c2, r) is introduced. Then, both
firms’ prices and the first order statistic of these two prices decrease in the
usual stochastic order. Specifically,
• if κ < 2c2 − c1 < r, we have P r,µ1 st P
κ,µ
1 , P
r,µ
2 st P
κ,µ
2 , and P
r,µ
(1) st
P
κ,µ
(1) ;
• if 2c2 − c1 < κ < r [κ < r < 2c2 − c1], we have P r,µ1 st P κ,µ1 ,
P r,µ2 st P κ,µ2 and P r,µ(1) st P κ,µ(1) where µ = µ [µ].
Proof: see Appendix A.3.
A price cap affects price distributions through two channels. First, there is
the direct effect on permissible prices which makes pricing more competi-
tive. The reason is that engaging in more aggressive price competition has
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become more attractive as profits from naive consumers decrease. That is,
the price distributions of both firms are shifted downwards. This is the case
when the price cap does not affect firm obfuscation. When it does, how-
ever, a reduction in the equilibrium share of naive consumers represents
another, indirect, and more important channel through which a price cap
forces prices down. This is because with other things being equal price com-
petition is fiercer when there is a larger share of sophisticated consumers.
This leads to a further downward shift of the price distributions.
Proposition 3 implies that the expected prices faced by each group of con-
sumers strictly decrease after the price cap. Moreover, when firm obfusca-
tion reduces, more consumers become sophisticated and are able to buy at
the lower price. A price cap thus clearly improves consumer welfare.
5.2 Firm profits
After imposing a price cap, the less efficient Firm 2 will make less expected
profits (see (5)). When the price cap does not induce a reduction in equi-
librium µ, Firm 1’s expected profits (4) also clearly decrease. When κ <
2c2− c1 < r, however, we should also take into account of the indirect effect
through µ. Nevertheless, a price cap reduces Firm 1’s expected profits in
this case too. Specifically,
Π̂κ1 − Π̂r1 =(κ− c1)
1
2
µ+ (c2 − c1)(1− µ)− (r − c1)1
2
µ− (c2 − c1)(1− µ)
= (κ− 2c2 + c1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
1
2
µ− (r − 2c2 + c1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1
2
µ < 0.
In summary, both firms’ expected profits are reduced by the price cap. How-
ever, the high-cost Firm 2 suffers weakly more in terms of absolute profits
and strictly more in terms of percentage losses.
6 Social welfare
We have seen that a price cap unequivocally improves consumer welfare.
On the other hand, it also unequivocally reduces firm profits. In this sec-
tion, we study how a price cap affects social welfare. The total benefit from
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production and consumption in the current model is r. The total cost, how-
ever, depends on how the production is divided between the two firms.
While each firm serves half of the naive consumers, the firm that has the
lower realized price sells to all sophisticated consumers.
Let the probability of the inefficient Firm 2 having the lower price in equi-
librium be denoted by
α :=
∫ κ
pκ,µ0
F κ,µ2 (p)dF
κ,µ
1 (p). (11)
Since Firm 2’s price first order stochastically dominates that of Firm 1, in-
tuitively, the probability that p2 < p1 shall be less than 12 . The following
Lemma gives a closed form solution for α and confirms this intuition.
Lemma 1.
i) Define t := µ(κ−c1)2(1−µ)(c2−c1) . Then,
α =
(
κ− c2
κ− c1
)
t
[
(1 + t) ln
(
1 +
1
t
)
− 1
]
. (12)
ii) α < 12 .
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
With the definition of α, the ex ante expected social welfare W can be writ-
ten as
W = r −
(µ
2
c1 +
µ
2
c2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
supplying naive consumers
− (1− µ)[(1− α)c1 + αc2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
supplying sophisticated consumers
= r − c1 − (c2 − c1)
[
1
2
µ+ α(1− µ)
]
. (13)
From (13), it is clear that social inefficiency arises because half of the naive
consumers and on average a measure α of sophisticated consumers buy
from the high-cost firm.
To understand the impact of a price cap on social welfare, we need to eval-
uate how α changes with κ. Since α is a function of both κ and µ, we cate-
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gorise two cases depending on whether or not the share of naive consumers
changes in equilibrium. Suppose µ remains unchanged as κ is imposed.
Since both firms’ prices decrease in the usual stochastic order, it is not clear
if α will decrease or increase. The same applies when in addition a reduc-
tion in µ is triggered by κ. It turns out that the introduction of a price cap
will decrease α in both cases. Indeed, in Appendix A.5 we prove as a lemma
that α strictly increases in κ for all κ ∈ (c2, r).
Given that the probability of Firm 2 having a lower price is decreased af-
ter the introduction of a price cap, social welfare (13) clearly increases if µ
remains unchanged. If µ is also reduced as a result of κ, social welfare in-
creases even further as more consumers can buy from the lower priced firm
which in equilibrium is more likely to be Firm 1. To see this, note that (13)
can be rearranged as
W = r − c1 − (c2 − c1)
[(
1
2
− α
)
µ+ α
]
.
By Lemma 1, α < 12 . Hence W increases if µ is reduced. To highlight,
Proposition 4. Imposing a price cap unequivocally increases social welfare.
Summarising, in this model with endogenous obfuscation, introducing a
price cap has two beneficial effects on consumer surplus and social welfare.
First, consumers benefit from more competitive pricing (for a given level
of consumer transparency) and the probability of the high-cost firm inef-
ficiently serving sophisticated consumers decreases. The intuition of this
effect can also be seen by examining the mass point in the pricing stage.
The size of this mass point is decreasing in the regulated price which im-
plies that informed consumer are more likely to purchase from the low-cost
firm after a price cap. Second, consumers benefit as firms obfuscate less and
the market may become more sophisticated. This second effect also benefits
the society as more consumers may be served by the more efficient low-cost
firm.13
13We point out that with identical marginal cost (c1 = c2) social welfare is a constant and
does not depend on the price cap.
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7 Extensions
7.1 Taxation
Taxation is another widely used public policy instrument. In this section
we discuss the effects of excise taxes on firms’ obfuscation incentives. An
excise tax is typically a per unit tax that is defined as a fixed amount for each
unit of a good or service sold, such as the Air Passenger Duty.
Suppose an excise tax 0 < τ < r − c2 is levied to each unit of the product
sold and is collected from the producers. Effectively, the two firms are now
producing at the marginal costs of c1 + τ and c2 + τ , respectively. Similar to
Proposition 2, we can establish that i) the high-cost Firm 2 chooses k∗2 = k¯
and ii) the low-cost Firm 1 chooses k∗1 = k¯ if c1 > cˆ1 and chooses k∗1 = k if
c1 < cˆ1 where cˆ1 := 2c2 + τ − r.
It follows that, when c˜1 < c1 < cˆ1 Firm 1 chooses full obfuscation in the ab-
sence of the excise tax while it prefers no obfuscation after its introduction.
On the other hand, when c1 < c˜1 or c1 > cˆ1 Firm 1’s obfuscation choice
remains unchanged at k and k, respectively.
Proposition 5. Suppose that an excise tax τ ∈ (0, r − c2) is imposed.
i) If c1 > 2c2 − r and τ > c1 + r − 2c2, the excise tax reduces the low-cost
Firm 1’s obfuscation choice from k to k.
ii) If c1 < 2c2 − r or, c1 > 2c2 − r but τ < c1 + r − 2c2, the introduction of
the excise tax has no effect on either firm’s obfuscation choice.
Proposition 5 reveals that when Firm 1 originally chooses full obfuscation, a
sufficiently high excise tax will reduce its incentive to obfuscate the market.
The intuition is similar to that of price regulation. After the introduction of
the excise tax, the profits earned by selling only to naive consumers are re-
duced and competition for the sophisticated consumers becomes less fierce
due to the higher marginal costs of production. Therefore, when the ex-
cise tax is sufficiently high, Firm 1 finds it more profitable to compete for
sophisticated consumers and consequently chooses not to obfuscate.
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In contrast to a price cap, an excise tax is likely to increase the prices in the
usual stochastic order. This is easily verified by inspecting the price dis-
tributions when the firms’ obfuscation choices remain unchanged. When
c˜1 < c1 < cˆ1, however, the share of naive consumers reduces from µ to µ. A
reduction in µ tends to increase price competition and decrease the prices
in the usual stochastic order. The overall effect will depend on the relative
strength of these two effects. In this sense, the result on consumer welfare
is less clear-cut under an excise tax than under a price cap. On the other
hand, an excise tax will unambiguously improve production efficiency.
Corollary 4. The probability of the inefficient Firm 2 having the lower price
in equilibrium, α, is reduced when an excise tax 0 < τ < r − c2 is imposed.
Proof: see Appendix A.6.
As both α and µ can only decrease after τ is imposed, following the same
analyses preceding Proposition 4, social welfare (13) will clearly increase if
the collected tax revenue is not wasted. The intuition is that an excise tax
affects different firms differently. In the extreme case of τ approaching r−c2,
Firm 2 will be forced to sell at the reservation price and as a consequence
sophisticated consumers almost always buy from the more efficient firm.
However, given inevitable inefficiencies in taxation and, if consumer wel-
fare is of significant importance, it seems price regulation is a better policy
measure than taxation in the current setting.
7.2 Prominence
In this section we consider the possibility that the more efficient firm may
also be more prominent among naive consumers in the sense of Gu and
Wenzel (2014). To this end, let φ ∈ [12 , 1) be the share of naive consumers
that the low-cost Firm 1 attracts. The remaining share of naive consumers
buy from Firm 2. Following the standard procedure, the structure of the
current pricing equilibrium remains as long as φ < r−c12r−c2−c1 . That is, Firm
2 has a mass point at r while Firm 1’s price distribution stays atomless.14
14Our condition guarantees that for any value of µ the high-cost firm has a mass point at
r. We note that if φ becomes large enough, the structure of the pricing equilibrium in Gu
and Wenzel (2014) will prevail where Firm 1 instead of Firm 2 has a mass point at r.
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The lower bound of the price distributions is dependent on the prominence:
p
′
0 =
r(1− φ)µ+ c2(1− µ)
(1− φ)µ+ (1− µ) .
The pricing stage equilibrium profits are, respectively,
Π
′
1 = [(r − c1)(1− φ)µ+ (c2 − c1)(1− µ)]
φµ+ (1− µ)
(1− φ)µ+ (1− µ)
Π
′
2 = (r − c2)(1− φ)µ
It follows that the high-cost Firm 2 - as in our baseline model - will choose
maximum obfuscation. However, now the incentives to obfuscate for Firm
1 depends not only on the cost differences but also on the level of promi-
nence. This can be seen from Firm 1’s marginal profits of obfuscation in the
obfuscation stage:
∂Π
′
1
∂k1
≷ 0⇔ (r + c1 − 2c2)− µ(2− µφ)
2
[2(1− φ)r + 2φc1 − 2c2] ≷ 0. (14)
When we consider small prominence, i.e. φ close to 12 , our main obfuscation
result in Proposition 2 holds true because 1 > µ(2−µφ)2 and hence (r+c1−2c2)
determines the sign of ∂Π
′
1
∂k1
. In other words, Firm 1 obfuscates only when
the cost advantage is small. Consequently, our policy analysis also applies
when prominence remains small.
We note that in the case of large prominence (that is, prominence plays the
dominant role compared to cost differences) results are different. In essence,
this case is studied in our previous work where firms only differ in promi-
nence but have identical cost (Gu and Wenzel, 2014). In these situations,
pricing and obfuscation incentives reverse. The more prominent firm has
larger incentives to choose high prices and generally prefers a more obfus-
cated market. We found that a price cap firstly has a direct positive effect of
reducing the size of the mass point in Firm 1’s pricing but on the other hand
it also increases Firm 2’s incentive to obfuscate. For the parameter values
we have checked, the direct effect dominates the other and hence even in
this large prominence scenario, the overall effect of a price cap tends to be
welfare improving.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has studied firms’ obfuscation choices when they differ in their
marginal costs of production. While the high-cost firm always fully obfus-
cates, the obfuscation choice of the low-cost firm depends on its cost advan-
tage. This paper has also investigated the impact of price regulation in this
asymmetric setting. While, in general, price regulation may not be a good
competition policy we demonstrate that, in such an environment, setting
a price cap reduces the incentives of the more efficient firm to obfuscate.
Thus, a price cap may be a good policy to promote market sophistication.
Moreover, the more efficient low-cost firm will on average supply a larger
share of the market after a price cap. This improves social welfare. While
caps on the scope of obfuscation and excise taxes can also be welfare im-
proving, price regulation seems to be a better policy measure.
Finally, we note that we do not advocate price regulation per se, but rather
point out that, in certain circumstances, there are positive effects of price
regulation. Introducing price caps might be a sensible idea in markets where
many consumers are inattentive or unable to understand the offered prod-
ucts and policies to tackle obfuscation can be easily avoided by firms. How-
ever, in situations with rational consumers existing research shows that price
caps may have negative consequences, for instance, in search models (Fer-
shtman and Fishman, 1994; Armstrong et al., 2009) or when the level of de-
mand is uncertain (Dobbs, 2004). Therefore, the positive effects of price caps
reported in this paper, have to be carefully weighed against other possibly
negative effects, for instance, on entry or innovation.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: First, by similar arguments, Propositions 1-5 in Narasimhan (1988) also
hold in the current setup. I.e., i) there exists no Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies; ii) in the unique pricing equilibrium exactly one firm has one mass point at
the reservation price r and it randomizes over (p0, r]. The other firm randomizes
over (p0, r) with no mass points.
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According to the above structure, suppose for the sake of contradiction that Firm
1 has a mass point at r. Then Firm 1 earns expected profits of (r − c1)µ2 when it
charges r and losing with probability 1 all sophisticated consumers. Denote the
lower boundary of the support by p′0. By charging p′0, on the other hand, Firm
1 receives all sophisticated consumers and hence makes expected profits of (p′0 −
c1)
[
µ
2 + (1− µ)
]
. As these expected profits have to level, p′0 =
µ(r−c1)
2−µ + c1. Then,
Firm 2 by charging p′0 expects to earn (p′0 − c2)
[
µ
2 + (1− µ)
]
. However, because
(c1 − c2)(1− µ) < 0,[
µ(r − c1)
2− µ + c1 − c2
] [µ
2
+ (1− µ)
]
< (r − c2)µ
2
.
Firm 2 hence can do strictly better by charging r and earning (r − c2)µ2 . This con-
tradicts with Firm 2 randomizing over (p′0, r).
We therefore can conclude that in the unique pricing equilibrium, Firm 2 has a
mass point at r and randomizes over (p0, r] while Firm 1 randomizes over (p0, r).
Firm 2’s expected profits are hence Π̂2 = (r − c2)µ2 . By Firm 2’s profits at p0, we
have
(p0 − c2)
[µ
2
+ (1− µ)
]
= (r − c2)µ
2
and hence, p0 = µ(r−c2)2−µ + c2.
At prices p ∈ (p0, r), Firm 2’s expected profits are
(p− c2)
[µ
2
+ (1− F1(p))(1− µ)
]
. (15)
Equating (15) and Π̂2, we have F1(p) = 1− µ(r−p)2(1−µ)(p−c2) .
It remains only to show F2(p). Note that Firm 1’s expected profits from charging
p0 are
Π̂1 = (p0 − c1)
[µ
2
+ (1− µ)
]
= (r − c1)µ
2
+ (c2 − c1)(1− µ), (16)
and its expected profits from charging prices p ∈ (p0, r) are
(p− c1)
[µ
2
+ (1− F2(p))(1− µ)
]
. (17)
Equating (16) and (17), it follows that F2(p) = 1− µ(r−p)2(1−µ)(p−c1) − c2−c1p−c1 . Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof: From (2) and (3), we have, for all p ∈ (p0, r),
F2(p) =
2(1− µ)(p− c2)− µ(r − p)
2(1− µ)(p− c1) =
p− c2
p− c1F1(p)
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=(
1− c2 − c1
p− c1
)
F1(p) < F1(p),
where the inequality follows from p > p0 > c2 > c1. It is then straightforward to
verify thatF2(p) ≤ F1(p) for all p ∈ [c2, r] and henceP2 st P1. Since for p ∈ (p0, r),
F2(p) < F1(p), P1 6st P2. Therefore, P2 st P1. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: We first prove these dominance relations when the share of naive con-
sumers remains unchanged after the price cap. We then verify that the prices “de-
crease” even further when µ decreases from µ to µ.
First, suppose 2c2 − c1 < κ < r or κ < r < 2c2 − c1. Then by Proposition 3, the
equilibrium share of naive consumers is not affected by the price cap. By inspecting
(9), it is easy to verify that F r,µ1 (p) ≤ Fκ,µ1 (p) for all p in the extended support of
[c2, r] and F r,µ1 (p) < F
κ,µ
1 (p) for all p ∈ (pκ,µ0 , κ). It then follows that P r,µ1 st Pκ,µ1 .
Similarly, by inspecting (10), we have P r,µ2 st Pκ,µ2 .
To show P r,µ(1) st Pκ,µ(1) , note that the cumulative distribution functions of P r,µ(1) and
Pκ,µ(1) are, respectively,
F r,µ(1) (p) = 1− (1− F r,µ1 (p))(1− F r,µ2 (p))
Fκ,µ(1) (p) = 1− (1− Fκ,µ1 (p))(1− Fκ,µ2 (p)).
Since F r,µ1 (p) < F
κ,µ
1 (p) and F
r,µ
2 (p) < F
κ,µ
2 (p) for p ∈ (pκ,µ0 , κ), F r,µ(1) (p) < Fκ,µ(1) (p)
for p ∈ (pκ,µ0 , κ). Also, F r,µ(1) (p) = Fκ,µ(1) (p) for p ∈ [c2, pκ,µ0 ] ∪ [κ, r]. It then follows
that P r,µ(1) st Pκ,µ(1) .
Second, suppose now that κ < 2c2 − c1 < r. By Proposition 3, the equilibrium
share of naive consumers decreases from µ to µ. Note that Fκ,µi , i = 1, 2, decreases
strictly in µ for all p ∈ (pκ,µ0 , κ). Therefore, a reduction in µ further increases Fκ,µi
and a similar proof as the above holds. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: i) We first note the following two preliminary results:∫
κ− p
(p− c1)(p− c2)2 dp =
κ− c1
(c2 − c1)2 ln
p− c1
p− c2 −
κ− c2
(c2 − c1)(p− c2) + C,∫
1
(p− c1)(p− c2)2 dp =
1
(c2 − c1)2 ln
p− c1
p− c2 −
1
(c2 − c1)(p− c2) + C.
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Then by definition (11) and making use the above results, we have α =∫ κ
pκ,µ0
[
1− µ(κ− p)
2(1− µ)(p− c1) −
c2 − c1
p− c1
]
µ(κ− c2)
2(1− µ)(p− c2)2 dp
=
{
F1|κpκ,µ0 −
µ2(κ− c2)
4(1− µ)2
∫ κ
p0
κ− p
(p− c1)(p− c2)2 dp
−µ(κ− c2)(c2 − c1)
2(1− µ)
∫ κ
pκ,µ0
1
(p− c1)(p− c2)2 dp
}
=
{
F1 +
[
µ(κ− c2)
2(1− µ)(c2 − c1) + 1
]
µ(κ− c2)
2(1− µ)(p− c2)
−
[
µ(κ− c1)
2(1− µ)(c2 − c1) + 1
]
µ(κ− c2)
2(1− µ)(c2 − c1) ln
p− c1
p− c2
}∣∣∣∣κ
pκ,µ0
=
µ(κ− c2)
2(1− µ)(c2 − c1) ·[(
1 +
µ(κ− c1)
2(1− µ)(c2 − c1)
)
ln
(
1 +
2(1− µ)(c2 − c1)
µ(κ− c1)
)
− 1
]
which is (12) after substitution.
ii) From Proposition 1, we know that Fκ,µ2 (p) < F
κ,µ
1 (p) for all p ∈ (pκ,µ0 , r). Then,
α =
∫ κ
pκ,µ0
Fκ,µ2 (p)dF
κ,µ
1 (p) <
∫ κ
pκ,µ0
Fκ,µ1 (p)dF
κ,µ
1 (p) =
1
2
.
Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. α strictly increases in κ for all κ ∈ (c2, r).
Proof: We first show that
h(t) := t
[
(1 + t) ln
(
1 +
1
t
)
− 1
]
(18)
is strictly increasing in t for all t > 0. Note that by definition, t = µ(κ−c1)2(1−µ)(c2−c1) ∈
(0,+∞). With this result, we then verify that α increases in κ when µ remains
unchanged and when µ increases as κ increases.
Note that dhdt = (1 + 2t) ln
(
1 + 1t
)− 2. To show (1 + 2t) ln (1 + 1t ) > 2, we let
g(t) := (1 + 2t) ln
(
1 +
1
t
)
.
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Since d
2g
dt2 =
−2
t2+t − 2(t
2+t)−(1+2t)2
(t2+t)2 =
1
(t2+t)2 > 0 for all t > 0 and
lim
t→+∞
dg
dt
= lim
t→+∞ 2 ln
(
1 +
1
t
)
− 1 + 2t
t2 + t
= 0,
dg
dt < 0 for all t > 0. Furthermore, by l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
lim
t→+∞ g(t) = limt→+∞
ln
(
1 + 1t
)
1
1+2t
= lim
t→+∞
(1 + 2t)2
2(t2 + t)
= 2.
Therefore, g(t) > 2 for all t > 0. This proves dhdt > 0 for all t > 0.
Now we check how α changes when the price limit κ increases. Note that t =
µ(κ−c1)
2(1−µ)(c2−c1) strictly increases in κ and µ.
Firstly, if µ remains unchanged, as the price limit κ increases, t increases and there-
fore h(t) increases. Because α =
(
κ−c2
κ−c1
)
h(t) and κ−c2κ−c1 increases in κ, α also in-
creases.
Secondly, if the increase in the price limit κ results in a switch from κ < 2c2−c1 < r
to 2c2− c1 < κ < r, then the equilibrium obfuscation will increase from µ to µ (see
Proposition 3). Nevertheless, the above still holds because t also increases in µ.
Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 4
Proof: Suppose that an excise tax 0 < τ < r − c2 is imposed. Note first that t as
defined in Lemma 1 decreases after the introduction of τ . This is because t(τ) =
µ(κ−c1−τ)
2(1−µ)(c2−c1) is clearly decreasing in τ while µ can only either remain unchanged
or decrease following the introduction of the tax.
In section A.5, we have established that h(t) is increasing in t. Moreover, κ−c2−τκ−c1−τ <
κ−c2
κ−c1 . It follows that
α(τ) =
(
κ− c2 − τ
κ− c1 − τ
)
h(t(τ)) <
(
κ− c2
κ− c1
)
h(t(0)) = α(0),
and hence α decreases after the excise tax τ is imposed. Q.E.D.
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